About

Presidents increasingly use personnel to exert direct control over the executive branch, reshaping the capacity, expertise and accountability of the institutions they lead. My work explains the strategy behind those choices, what they cost in government performance, and what reform would be needed to change course.

I am a Senior Manager on the policy team at the Partnership for Public Service, where I lead research on presidential personnel, the Senate confirmation process, civil service politicization and federal oversight, as well as the Partnership’s Political Appointee Tracker with The Washington Post. I have authored or co-authored more than 30 policy publications, including reports for the Brookings Institution and the Partnership’s Center for Presidential Transition, cited by Congress and major think tanks and covered by outlets including The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal and the Associated Press. My work translates original data and analysis into actionable recommendations for lawmakers, transition teams and agency leaders. I regularly brief Capitol Hill staff on institutional reform and workforce data, and I convene policymakers, scholars and advocacy groups through public and private forums on governance reform.

Across this work, I treat personnel as a central instrument of presidential power, one that shapes both who governs and how well government performs. A consistent finding is that the strategies presidents use to maximize control over agencies often erode the capacity they rely on to govern effectively.

My current work examines the Trump administration’s second term as a stress test of the institutional arrangements governing executive branch personnel. Across political appointments, nominations, acting officials, inspector general independence, independent boards and commissions, and civil service reclassification, the administration is pushing the boundaries of presidential personnel power in ways that directly implicate the questions my research has long examined. I am developing work on what this moment reveals about the durability of democratic accountability mechanisms in the administrative state and what reform would be needed to restore them.

My academic research has been published in the Journal of Politics, Presidential Studies Quarterly and the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. It examines three connected questions: how presidents strategically use acting officials and nominations when faced with a dysfunctional confirmation process; how leadership vacancies affect federal agency performance; and why the public provides so little accountability for the staffing decisions that shape how government works. Together, these studies trace presidential strategy through its consequences for agency performance to the political conditions that sustain the status quo.

I am also an Adjunct Professor at George Washington University, where I teach a graduate course in Legislative Data and Analytics, and a Practitioner Fellow at the Miller Center at the University of Virginia.

I hold a Ph.D. and M.A. in Political Science from Vanderbilt University and a B.S. in Political Science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.